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Abstract
Recent years have seen a significant increase in complexity of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) ownership structures. Complex corporate struc-
tures raise concerns on the effectiveness of national and international in-
vestment policies, based on the notion of investors’ nationality. This mo-
tivates this research effort aimed at analysing the ownership structures
of some 700 thousand foreign affiliates (FAs). A new methodology, the
bottom-up approach, is introduced. The main objective is to empirically
map the "shareholder space" of FAs, along the vertical dimension, from
the direct shareholders to the ultimate owners. We find that FAs are often
part of transnational investment chains; more than 40% of foreign affiliates
have direct and ultimate shareholders in different jurisdictions ("double or
multiple passports"). Based on shareholders’ nationality, we then propose
and empirically analyse the salient features of four main archetypes of FAs
ownership structure: plain foreign, conduit structures, round-tripping and
domestic hubs. Each poses specific challenges to the policy-maker.
Keywords: multinational enterprises, ownership structures, firm-level, investors’
nationality
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1 Introduction: multinationals ownership structures
Recent years have seen a significant increase in complexity of multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) ownership structures. On the one hand, as the global economy
is becoming more and more integrated, and industrial production processes in-
creasingly fragmented across different countries, the enhanced complexity of
corporate structures seems a natural outcome of a search for efficiency; see for
example the World Investment Report (WIR, 2013), on the link between global
value chains and MNEs activity as captured by foreign direct investment. On
the other, there is a widespread sentiment that MNEs "artificially" add com-
plexity mostly for tax- and financial-related purposes. Indeed, the WIR (2015)
provides evidence that investment schemes involving offshore financial centres,
special purpose entities and transit FDI are important tools in MNE tax mini-
mization efforts.
This may result in increased depth of corporate structures, with affiliates ever
further removed from corporate headquarters in chains of ownership, dispersed
shareholdings of affiliates (with individual affiliates being owned indirectly
through multiple shareholders), cross-shareholdings (with affiliates owning shares
in each other), and shared ownerships (e.g. in joint ventures). Corporate struc-
tures becoming increasingly complex leads to important concerns on the effec-
tiveness of national and international investment policies relying on the notion
of investor’s nationality.
La Porta et al. (1999) is one of the earliest attempts to describe ownership pat-
terns of large corporations across countries. The study looks at the beneficial
ownership of a sample of large corporations in rich countries, to assess how
concentrated their ownership is, who exerts control and how. The authors doc-
ument the presence of pyramidal structure of control and rare cases of cross-
shareholding.
A later stream of academic research concentrated on specific factors influenc-
ing financial and investment choices of MNEs, which may in turn affect the
structure of ownership chains. Many look at possible tax considerations: Alt-
shuler and Grubert (2002) analyse how multinationals use affiliates to imple-
ment investment-repatriation strategies; Desai et al. (2003) look at ownership
3
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372329 
chains to quantify the extent to which location of investment and reported prof-
its are sensitive to tax rate differentials; Desai et al. (2006) explore tax avoidance
strategies of multinational firms and report evidence suggesting that affiliates in
tax havens are used to reallocate income and deferring home country taxation;
Grubert (2012) estimates suggest that foreign tax differentials may have sig-
nificantly raised the foreign share of multinationals worldwide income. Other
factors were also considered, for example: Desai et al. (2004a) explore trends in
joint ventures (JVs) formation looking at both tax changes and coordination in-
centives; Desai et al. (2004b) investigate how financing frictions and general local
capital market conditions influence multinationals choices in capital structure;
Desai et al. (2008) study how multinationals can overcome financial constraints
using their internal capital market.
With the exception of the pioneer paper of La Porta et al. (1999), in all these stud-
ies the analysis of complexity in corporate ownership structures was incidental
rather than the focus. Only recently an emerging stream of literature is looking
specifically at links in global ownership chains of multinational corporations,
to explore how ownership chains look like, how complex and heterogeneous
these structures are and what factors drive this complexity. Mintz and Weichen-
rieder (2010) analyse ownership chains of German MNEs with particular focus
on the role of conduit entities and holding companies. They first document the
increasing relevance and complexity of both holding companies and indirectly
owned subsidiaries in German FDI over the 1990s. The study further shows that
factors influencing the existence of these complicated ownership structures are
withholding taxes, the possibility of group consolidation and the type of credit
system of the capital exporting country.
Another relevant contribution comes from Lewellen and Robinson (2013). The
paper analyses ownership structures of U.S. multinationals and explores the de-
terminants of their complexity. It shows that complex structures are widespread,
involving as many as half of the MNEs in the sample. At the same time, com-
plexity seems to be polarizing. While there has been a steady reduction in the
overall share of complex firms between 1994 and 2009, complex MNEs are be-
coming increasingly more complex. Lewellen and Robinson (2013) find that spe-
cific tax motives, including minimization of U.S. tax on income earned abroad,
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as well as income withholding and capital taxes imposed abroad are promi-
nent determinants of complex structures. In addition, concerns about political
and expropriation risks, seek for investment protection through international
agreements (bilateral investment treaties (BITs)), considerations on financial ex-
posure, financing strategies and the broader institutional environment of the
host country hjmay also play a role.
Analysis on U.S. MNEs by Dyreng et al. (2015), confirm that both considerations
about tax on equity distribution as well as other country characteristics such as
corruption and foreign investment risk influence the structure of equity chains.
A recent important research stream, lying at the intersection between interna-
tional business, economics and computer science, applies the powerful analyti-
cal toolkit provided by network theory to the analysis of complexity in corporate
structures, e.g. in an effort to identify trends and patterns in global corporate
control (Vitali et al., 2011; Rungi et al., 2017). Recent work of Garcia-Bernardo
et al. (2017) also uses network theory to identify the role of offshore financial
centres (OFCs) in global corporate structures.
Generally, these studies have applied a "top-down" approach, looking at all pos-
sible ownership links in a given corporate group, i.e. starting from the parent
company. To our knowledge, this paper is the first employing a "bottom-up"
approach. Complexity here is seen from the perspective of the individual affil-
iate and the host country rather than the parent and the investor country. In
line with this approach, immediate policy applications of this analysis concern
primarily national investment policies in FDI host countries and, more specifi-
cally, the effectiveness of investment rules and regulation based on the notion
of foreign ownership.
2 Analytical perspective
2.1 The bottom-up approach
A parent entity is connected to its subsidiaries through layers of equity owner-
ship links which determine its direct or indirect level of control. Affiliates can
have one or more direct shareholders and numerous indirect shareholders in
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addition to their ultimate owner, all potentially located in different countries.
Looking at the depth and the transnationality of these ownership chains is cru-
cial to understand elements of complexity of multinationals most relevant to e
investment policy.
This work empirically analyses FAs ownership scenarios based on the national-
ity of its shareholders. To this purpose, a new "bottom-up" approach looking at
the ownership chain starting from the foreign affiliate is introduced and applied
to the analysis of a large database of FAs extracted from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis
database.
Figure 1: A "bottom-up" perspective on MNE ownership structures: the view
from the host country
Compared to the previous literature, the bottom-up approach (Figure 1) shifts
the focus form the parent to the single affiliate company and analyses its share-
holder space all the way up to the parent entity. While this space consists of all
companies that directly or indirectly own a stake in the target unit, this anal-
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ysis specifically focuses on the two main shareholders: the direct owner and
the ultimate owner (i.e. global ultimate owner or GUO, as defined in Orbis).
The direct owner is the direct shareholder holding a majority stake; the ulti-
mate owner is the last corporate entity connected to the direct owner through a
chain of majority shares. In principle the direct and the ultimate owner may not
exist when the shareholder structure is fragmented; however, previous UNC-
TAD research (see for example WIR (2016)) has proven that the vast majority of
FAs, up to 90%, do have a majority shareholder (that may or may not coincide
with the GUO depending on the vertical complexity of the ownership chain). In
addition to the mapping of direct and ultimate owners, this methodology also
allows to derive auxiliary indicators of ownership complexity, e.g. number of
links from the affiliate to its GUO (hierarchical distance or HD) or the number
of jurisdictions crossed by the majority ownership chain.
This approach is not meant to explore the full complexity of a corporate group.
Yet, it is helpful to describe the salient features of the shareholder space for indi-
vidual affiliates, to map the main ownership chain from the direct shareholder
level to the ultimate owner, and to assess complexity, mainly in terms of "depth"
and "transnationality", of ownership networks for aggregates of companies (e.g.
by country, by region or by industry).
2.2 Data extraction
The bottom-up analysis requires a massive extraction of firm-level ownership
information from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database.
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database is widely recognized as the most comprehen-
sive firm-level database of its kind. At the time of the extraction (November
2015) it provided information on 136 million active companies across over 200
countries merged from different sources (e.g. official administrative registries).
Starting from the full sample of ORBIS, we progressively refine the perimeter of
interest, to finally target 4.5 million companies, of which 700 thousand foreign
affiliates, the main focus of this study (see appendix A for a description of the
steps for the construction of the database).
The final sample results from the combination of three main criteria (Figure 2).
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(1) Corporate shareholding confines the analysis to corporate entities. (2) Iden-
tified corporate GUOs focuses the scope to majority-owned links. (3) Foreign
shareholding further zooms on foreign affiliates, i.e. companies with a foreign
ownership component, either at the level of the direct or of the ultimate owner.
Figure 2: Perimeter of interest
Few caveats should be kept in mind. First, even though the cases of cross-
shareholdings, preferential shares and voting blocs should not be common, re-
straining the sample to majority ownership chains inflate the share of simpler
ownership structures. Second, the focus on corporate boundaries excludes de
facto beneficial ownership from the scope of the analysis.1 Third, selected enti-
ties with more complete data may bias the sample coverage toward bigger and
potentially more complex firms. Finally, but crucially, coverage of companies’
information in ORBIS is highly heterogeneous across countries, significantly
higher for developed countries than for developing ones.2
1However, companies with corporate shareholders have better information than those with
individual or family-shareholders. For example, 95 per cent of the corporate-owned companies
(with known shareholders) also report information on shares and location of the shareholders
while the share decreases to 60 per cent for family-owned companies.
2This is a very well-known limit of any firm-level analysis based on ORBIS, partially miti-
gated in this study by two considerations. First, foreign affiliates, the main focus of this anal-
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3 Investor nationality mismatch
Comparison of the nationalities of the direct and the ultimate owner for the 700
thousand foreign affiliates in the sample reveals that in 40% of the cases they
are from different countries, resulting in investor nationality mismatches (Figure
3). The mismatch index represents the share of cases of nationality mismatch
between the direct and the ultimate owner in a group of affiliates and it is an
indicator of transnationality of the ownership chain.
Figure 3: Investor nationality: the big picture
Nationality mismatches are linked to vertical complexity. The mismatch index
and the transnationality of the ownership chain (number of countries involved)
increases with the depth and complexity of the ownership chain, as measured by
the hierarchical distance (HD), i.e. the number of ownership steps between the
ultimate owner and the target affiliate (Figure 4). While in the main sample the
mismatch index is at 41% (see Figure 1), FAs part of multi-step chains (HD>1)
exhibit a share of mismatch cases over 70%. Highly complex and transnational
ysis, are less exposed to sample heterogeneity because they are generally larger and subject to
more stringent reporting standards compared to domestic firms. Second, coverage of owner-
ship information in ORBIS is significantly better than financial information, even in developing
economies.
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ownership chains however are not so common, involving a relatively limited
number of large foreign affiliates.
Figure 4: Nationality mismatches and MNE complexity
Policy implications of investor nationality mismatches are discussed in great
detail in the WIR (2016). For international investment policies, at the core of the
policy discussion lies the multilateralizing effect of complex structures. The pos-
sibility of designing ever more "inclusive" corporate structures expands de facto
the coverage of multilateral treaties way beyond the original scope. Investors
can even engage in treaty shopping to deliberately chase the most convenient
treatment. Up to a third of apparently intra-regional parent-FA relationships
in major prospective mega-regional areas are in reality controlled by ultimate
owners outside the region (Figure 5). This clearly raises concerns about ultimate
beneficiaries of these treaties and negotiations. National investment policies too
can be affected by mismatch in investor nationality. The specific implications
depend on the particular schemes generating the nationality mismatch; they
will be discussed in the next section introducing ownership archetypes.
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Figure 5: Ownership of foreign affiliates in some mega-regional areas (under
discussion at the time of the analysis)
4 The ownership matrix and archetypes
In addition to high-level mapping of FA investors’ nationality, the bottom-up
approach allows also a closer look at the most relevant shareholding schemes.
Comparing the location of the direct and the ultimate owners of all 4.5 million
companies in the perimeter (i.e. including domestic ones) yields a two-by-two
matrix, the ownership matrix, summarizing the relevant investor-nationality
scenarios by means of four main archetypes (Figure 6). Excluding then do-
mestic companies (bottom left quadrant in the matrix), the resulting ownership
archetypes for FAs are: i. Plain Foreign; ii. Conduit Structure; iii. Round trip-
ping; and iv. Domestic Hubs.
(i) Plain Foreign
This is the simplest case with both the direct and the ultimate owner from the
same (foreign) country (Figure 6). Numerically it is the most frequent scheme,
covering almost 60% of the FAs in the sample. However, in operational terms,
the average size of both FAs and MNEs involved is significantly smaller than
11
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Figure 6: The ownership matrix and archetypes
Table 1: Key statistics by archetype
Archetype i Archetype ii Archetype iii Archetype iv
(Plain Foreign) (Conduit) (Round Tripping) (Domestic Hubs)
N of cases 426,427 78,722 7,903 209,229
Frequency 59% 11% 1% 29%
Avg. Hierarchical Distance 1.39 3.15 3.19 3.31
Subsidiary Avg. Revenues (milions) 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.10
GUOs Avg. Revenues (milions) 10.56 19.60 12.01 23.66
Share Conduit OFCs 30% 51% 60% 14%
Share GUOs OFCs 30% 32% 27% 34%
that of the other archetypes (Table 1).
This scheme does not give rise to any issue of investor’s nationality mismatch.3
Around 75% of archetype (i) cases, corresponding to half of the entire sample,
are just one-to-one link between an investor and a recipient (hierarchical dis-
tance equal to 1), where the direct and the ultimate owners coincide. This is
3Its frequency at 59% corresponds to the complementary of the mismatch index (at 41%;
Figure 4 and 5). In principle it is possible to have multiple investor nationalities also in this case
when direct and ultimate owners are from the same (foreign) country but some intermediate
shareholder from a different country. However, this option is residual.
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the simplest possible type of shareholding structure (Figure 7). By construction,
the distribution of the direct and ultimate owners across different countries is
the same, and roughly reflect the economic size of the countries (Figure 9). The
share of OFCs (Table 1), at 30%, is more limited than in more complex schemes
such as conduit structures (archetype ii) and round-tripping (archetype iii), but
sizable (and larger than expected based on the economic size of OFCs).
Figure 7: A closer look to plain foreign archetype: frequency of simple
schemes
Note: Frequencies of cases are presented in bold while number of cases are presented
in parenteses.
(ii) Conduit Structure
Conduit structures arise when direct and ultimate owners are from two different
foreign countries. This is typically a result of transit or conduit FDI. These
schemes are particularly complex because they involve at least three countries,
the domestic country of the foreign affiliate and two foreign countries (of the
direct and the ultimate owner, respectively), and potentially more intermediate
jurisdictions. The minimal hierarchical distance is two, with the average above
three (Table 1). Archetype (ii) covers 11% of the FAs in the sample, confirming
that highly complex structures, although not prominent, they are not residual
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either. In financial and operational terms, their weight is likely to be higher as
conduit structures are generally associated with bigger companies (both at the
parent and foreign affiliate levels).
In around half of the cases, the conduit jurisdictions (i.e. the jurisdictions of
the direct owner) are offshore financial centers (OFCs) (Table 1 and Figure 9).
The composition of GUOs instead reflects more closely the economic size, even
though, the share of OFCs among the GUOs (at about 30%) is somewhat surpris-
ing. Conduit structures are challenging from the investors’ nationality perspec-
tive, and they are one component of the mismatch index. The relative weight
of conduit structure is higher for developing than for developed countries, both
in the whole sample (16% against 10%) and, more visibly, as a share of the
mismatch cases (59% vis a vis 21%) (Figure 10).
Conduit structures are very relevant from a policy perspective; they play a role
in tax avoidance, but also in policies related to national security and compe-
tition. In national investment policies, the implications of this archetype are
instead limited as the focus is usually on foreignness rather than nationality.
(iii) Round-Tripping
Round-tripping describes a situation where the affiliate is from the same county
as the ultimate owner, while the direct owner is foreign; in other words, the
parent invests domestically through a foreign intermediate subsidiary (Figure
6). It is the most controversial archetype, often brought up as an example of
a harmful or abusive MNE practice. Looking at the frequency of this scheme,
at only 1% of all FAs in the sample, its relevance in the world of international
production is likely to be smaller than generally perceived (Table 1). Not only
round-tripping is quite limited, but it is also very much confined to a small
set of identifiable cases; fifteen schemes only cover almost half of the cases of
round-tripping (Figure 8).
The round-tripping archetype shares with conduit structures the heavy use of
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offshore financial centres as direct investors (at 60% of cases) (Table 1).4 Inter-
estingly, large MNEs, while relying on conduit structures, are less involved into
round-tripping, more popular among small and medium size multinationals.
Despite its limited size, round-tripping is at the centre of the attention of policy-
makers. It has similar policy implications as conduit structures, involving dif-
ferent policy areas (international investment, taxation, competition policies, na-
tional security), but typically with more controversial links to illicit practices
such as money laundering. Also the level of national investment policy may be
affected to the extent that domestic investors gain access to benefits reserved to
foreign investors, for example in the form of fiscal incentives.
Figure 8: Common round-tripping schemes
4As a caveat, such small share of round-tripping can be partially due to the fact that the
foreign conduit jurisdictions employed in round-tripping schemes tipically have strong confi-
dentiality standards, to disguise the "real" domestic nature of the investment. In such cases,
ORBIS may not detect upper layers in the ownership chain, and the bottom-up approach may
stop at the level of the conduit jurisdiction, qualifying the archetype as plain foreign or a con-
duit structure with an OFC GUO rather than round-tripping (with domestic GUO). Balance of
Payment statistics on ultimate investors available for a limited sample of countries suggests a
share of round-tripping in FDI stock at about 5%, with significant variability across countries.
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(iv) Domestic Hubs
Foreign affiliates may be directly owned by a domestic corporate entity, acting
as domestic hub, while the ultimate owner, the MNE parent, is located in a
different country (Figure 6). This archetype is quite common, covering up to
a third of foreign affiliates (Table 1). It implies the establishment of a local
network of affiliates and it is more widespread in mature and large economies,
such as those of the larger EU members or the United States (Figure 10). It can
also emerge as the result of M&A operations whereby local affiliates of an MNE
acquire companies operating in the host country.
Domestic hubs are generally associated not only with major economies, but also
with large MNEs, with a need to establish a multiple and capillary presence in
some important host markets (Table 1). Similar to conduit structures (archetype
ii) and round-tripping (archetype iii), this archetype generates mismatches in in-
vestors nationality (i.e. between a domestic direct owner and a foreign ultimate
owner). However by many respects, it is less problematic. It is characterized by
a limited use of OFCs and both the distribution of direct shareholders and GUOs
tend to reflect the economic size of the investor countries (Table 1 and Figure
9). The rationale behind these schemes is largely driven by economic and busi-
ness considerations rather than regulatory arbitrage or financial optimization.
Challenges related to the multilateralizing effects of nationality mismatches and
coverage of international treaties appear to be less relevant in this context. On
the other side, concerns may arise on national investment policies, as disguised
foreignness may lead to the circumvention of foreign ownership restrictions.
16
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Figure 9: Top 20 largest investor countries by archetype: share of total
Note: Bars represent frequencies of country appearances as direct or ultimate owners.
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Figure 10: Share of archetypes by region
5 Summary and conclusion
Complexity of MNEs ownership structures is an important feature of today’s
globalized production. It has ramifications and implications in policy areas
such as investment policies, tax policies and competition policies. One effect of
corporate complexity, relatively less explored in the literature, is the blurring
of investors’ nationality; the main policy question being: if a company (for-
eign affiliate) has investors from multiple countries (multiple passports) which
is the relevant investors’ nationality for investment policy purposes? This paper
focuses on those cases where the two key shareholders, the direct owner (major-
ity shareholder) and the ultimate owner, are from different countries (mismatch
cases). It shares two main analytical contributions. First, the issue of mismatch
in investor nationality is assessed at the aggregate level, based on a large firm-
level sample of around 700 thousand FAs. Second, a more granular view on
the underlying shareholding schemes is provided, leading to the definition of
18
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four relevant archetypes: plain foreign, conduit structure, round-tripping and
domestic hubs. Each archetype is empirically analysed and policy implications
discussed.
The following items reflect the main findings from the empirical analysis of
archetypes.
• Contrary to the perception, complex multi-country structures are not the
norm; most ownership structures are quite simple (plain foreign); half
are limited to a one-to-one relationship between the shareholder and the
foreign affiliate.
• However, nationality mismatches are relevant (40%) and remains a chal-
lenge in current FDI landscape. Nationality mismatch does not necessary
imply highly complex ownership structures; complexity is mostly con-
fined to conduit structures and round-tripping.
• Conduit structures are not prominent but sizable; round-tripping is resid-
ual (and less common than perceived). Both conduit structures and round-
tripping make heavy use of offshore financial centers.
• Domestic hubs is a common instance of nationality mismatch, not associ-
ated with particularly complex structures. It is concentrated in large and
mature markets.
• The distribution of ownership archetypes is not uniform across level of de-
velopment and MNE sizes. Smaller companies tend to prefer simpler solu-
tions (plain foreign) while larger MNEs are more prone to build complex
network, either in the form of domestic hubs (developed economies) or
transnational conduit structures (developing economies). Round-tripping
schemes are instead limited to few jurisdictions, usually involving smaller
size MNEs.
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Figure 11 concludes with a summary of the salient features of each archetype
and flags the key points of policy relevance.
Figure 11: Archetypes: summary of the salient features
Note: The "size" is based on the frequency of the archetypes in the sample. However,
a range was introduced to adjust upward (i.e. with empirical frequency at the lower
bound) archetype ii (conduit structures) and iii (round-tripping) and downward (i.e.
with empirical frequency at the upper bound) archetype i (plain foreign). This adjust-
ment accounts for a potential bias in the sample, arising when ORBIS GUO in archetype
1 is an OFC (30% of cases). In these cases, it is possible that ORBIS is unable to detect
upper layers of ownership due to poor reporting standard of the GUO and a conduit or
round-tripping scheme is then classified as plain foreign (see also footnote 4).
20
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A Appendix. Construction of the firm-level database
Figure A.1: Construction of the firm-level ownership database
Step 1. Extract companies reporting at least one shareholder. This initial sub-
sample consists of 22 million firms, mainly private liability companies (almost
80%); it excludes branches, most sole traders and proprietorship and all com-
panies with missing information. For each of the selected companies retained,
when available, the following data: name, location, type, key financials (assets,
revenues and employees), shareholders (SHs) names, SHs stakes, SHs types,
and SHs location.
Step 2. Remove all those entities for which the shareholder’s location is unavail-
able or the stakes of direct shareholders are missing or incomplete (i.e. the sum
of direct shares is below 50 percent). The remaining sample presents complete
information on direct shareholding and a total sum of direct shares above 50
percent (for 80% of observations the aggregate share adds up to 100 percent).
Step 3. Restrict the perimeter of the analysis to corporate boundaries. Specif-
ically, select affiliates with shareholders belonging to the following corporate
types only: corporate industrial, corporate financial, foundations/no profit,
public entities. This leaves out mainly companies with individual or family
shareholders and residual cases of mixed ownership or marginal ownership
categories.
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Step 4. Retain companies with complete and consistent information on the
global ultimate owner. The remaining companies in the sample have one share-
holder which qualifies as a corporate GUO and present complete information
of the ownership path linking the affiliate to the GUO.
Final perimeter of the analysis includes 4.5 million affiliates with complete infor-
mation of the majority ownership chain, of which 0.7 million companies qualify-
ing as foreign affiliates, i.e. with either a foreign direct shareholder or a foreign
ultimate owner or both.
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